Power relations in the International Monetary Fund: a study of the political economy of a priori voting power using the Theory of Simple Games by Leech, Dennis
1Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR),
University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United-Kingdom. URL:
http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/CSGR
Power Relations in the International Monetary Fund:  A
Study of the Political Economy of a priori Voting
Power using the Theory of Simple Games
Dennis Leech
CSGR Working Paper No. 06/98
May 1998
2Power Relations in the International Monetary Fund:  A Study of the
Political Economy of a priori Voting  Power using the Theory of Simple
Games
Dennis Leech1
University of Warwick
CSGR Working Paper No. 06/98
May 1998
Abstract:
In general in organisations whose system of governance involves weighted majority
voting, power and voting weight differ. Power indices are a value concept for majority voting
games which provide a means of analysing this difference. This paper provides new algorithms
for computing the two classical power indices (the Banzhaf index and the S apley-Shubik index)
and applies them to the voting distribution in the two governing bodies of the IMF in each year
since its foundation. The focus is both substantive, being an analysis of the political economy of
the IMF,  and methodological, as a study of the use of the power indices. Power relations are
studied with respect to two types of decisions: ordinary decisions requiring a simple majority and
decisions requiring a special majority of 80% or 85%. Clear cut results are obtained for the
former: among the G5 countries discrepancies between power and voting weight have declined
over time with the exception of the United States which continues to have much more power
than its weight even though that weight has declined. In the nineteen forties the United
Kingdom’s power was considerably below its relatively large nominal voting power, similarly to
some extent for France. Both power indices give results which are qualitatively comparable. For
decisions requiring special majorities, however, few general results emerge because of conflict
between the indices. We examine the effect of the size of the majority requirement on the power
of the leading members and find that the power of the US declines as the majority requirement
increases. This result confirms the warnings of Keynes that the US insistence on retaining a
national veto for itself might be counterproductive. We conclude that the special majority
requirement creates a distortion in the voting system which can be regarded as a serious lack of
transparency. We also examine the effect of the EU countries voting as a block rather than
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3individually and show that it would be dominant and the US power would fall considerably. We
conclude that it is not possible to make a clear choice between the two power indices used but
that there is some indication that the Banzhaf index may be more plausible.
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4Nontechnical Summary:
This paper reports a study of the voting system provided for in the Articles of Agreement of
the IMF. It uses a method of analysis derived from the theory of games to study real voting
power - the ability to determine voting outcomes. It uses the method of Voting Power Indices
to measure each country's power. The paper is partly concerned with aspects of this little-used
methodology as well as the IMF.
It presents a separate analysis for each of the two governing bodies of the IMF, the Board of
Governors - where each member country has a seat - and the Executive Board - with a small
number of representatives, some appointed directly by the USA, Germany, Japan, France and
Britain, and some elected by groups of countries. Both bodies employ systems of weighted
voting where a country's votes reflect its quota.  In such weighted voting bodies it is well
known that a member's actual power to swing a vote has no simple relationship to its actual
number of votes (another well-known example is the European Council of Ministers).
Our findings are:
1. Votes do not reflect power.
In both the Board of Governors and the Executive Board power is more unequally
distributed than votes.
2. United States more powerful than is apparent.
The United States has a greater share of the power than its share of the votes; all other
members have less power than their votes.
A separate analysis has been done for each year of the IMF' existence. A similar pattern has
emerged for each year although the dominance of the USA has declined in quantitative
terms. In the first year, 1946, the USA had 33 percent of the votes but our measure of its
voting power was over 43 percent: it could theoretically swing 40 percent of possible votes
from losing to winning. By 1996 its share of the votes had fallen to 18 percent and its
voting power to over 21 percent. This shows that there is a sort of "hidden weighting"
which has benefitted the United States at the expense of the other members.
3. UK less powerful than previously thought.
The United Kingdom was the principal loser in the early years. In 1946 it had the second-
largest number of votes, with over 15 percent. Nevertheless its voting power was
considerably less than this, at most 12 percent. This discrepancy has virtually disappeared
over time as the United Kingdom's share of the votes has declined and as voting has become
more dispersed.
4. Voting "paradoxes" have occurred.
We have investigated whether any "voting paradoxes" - where a member's share of the
votes has increased but its share of power fallen or vice versa - and found that some have
occurred in the cases of the UK, France and other countries but their magnitude has been
small.
5. Keynes was right to oppose the US insistence on special majorities.
An important part of the analysis was to examine the effect of different majorities on power
relations. The most important decisions require special majorities - originally four fifths but
5later increased to 85%. They were introduced at the insistence of the USA so that it would
have a single-country veto. We have looked at the power distribution for different majority
requirements and found that the introduction of special majorities was short-s ghted both
from the point of view of the effectiveness of the IMF and that of the USA within the IMF,
as Keynes warned in 1943. It makes it difficult for decisions to be taken and gives an
effective veto to a small group of other countries which might oppose US plans. The effect
of a large majority requirement is to make the power distribution much more equal and
therefore is not consonant with the inequality of voting designed into the IMF.
6. Effect of a European Union Block.
We have looked at the possible scenario of the fifteen EU countries voting as a single unit
rather than separately. The combined EU vote in 1996 was 28 percent and therefore it
would be dominant with almost 40 percent of the voting power. It would gain power at the
expense of the USA.
7. Merits of different power indices.
The study uses two different power indices in parallel: the Banzhaf index and the S apley-
Shubik index. They purport to be both measures of the same thing but differ in their details.
Our purpose in this study was to compare their results and if possible draw conclusions
about their relative merits for future work. On the basis of the discussion in the paper we
suggest there may be some grounds for preferring the Banzhaf index.
1"POWER RELATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: A STUDY OF THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A PRIORI VOTING  POWER USING THE THEORY OF SIMPLE
GAMES"  by Dennis Leech, University of Warwick, October 1997
I. Introduction
The governance of the IMF is of continuing interest not only because of the
obvious importance of the organisation to the management of the world economy
in an era of increasing economic globalisation. It is also a worthwhile subject of
research because the IMF is one of a small number of international organisations
(the World Bank, the European Union Council of Ministers and regional
development banks are others) that operate on the basis of the weighted voting
power of their members (in contrast for example to the United Nations). This
inequality of voting power among members of the IMF reflects the inequality of
their quotas and therefore their respective financial contributions. Inequality of
power among members is therefore a fundamental feature of the design of the
system of governance. However, this raises the important question of precisely
what is meant by unequal power. If power is defined as the ability to influence
voting outcomes, to make a difference to decisions taken in this way, then it is
not always true that there is an exact correspondence between power and nominal
voting strength. Indeed it has been known for a long time (e.g. Banzhaf (1965),
Coleman(1971), Lucas (1983)) that it is generally the case that in a body which
2uses weighted voting, there is no simple relationship between power and voting
weight2.
In many weighted voting bodies power is much more unequally distributed than
voting weight so that the nominal data can give a misleading picture. Members
with very large voting weight can possess a disproportionately greater voting
power - there is in a sense an extra "invisible weighting" - and other members
proportionately less. Moreover, voting "paradoxes" can and do arise, particularly
when there are changes to the membership, the distribution of votes or the
decision rule (e.g. Brams (1975), Brams and Affuso (1976), also Felsenthal and
Machover (1995)). Cases have been shown to occur where a change in voting
weight has led to a change in power in the opposite direction. Similarly it is
possible for individual voters to have no power at all despite possessing an
apparently significant number of votes. (A good example of this is Luxembourg in
the EC Council of Ministers before 1973, whose one vote was never able to
make any difference given the votes of the other countries.).
It is therefore of intrinsic interest to consider the voting system in the IMF
from this point of view, by analysing the distribution of a priori v ting power3.
Despite its importance and interest relatively little research has been done on this
                                  
2 In the discussion about the IMF voting system the term voting power is used to denote the number of
votes (or fraction of the total) cammanded by a member country. Since in this paper we are making a
fundamental distinction between this and actual power as defined, we will use the term voting weight
instead from now on.
3aspect, in contrast to other voting bodies. We are aware of only two studies
which have adopted a similar approach to the one employed here: those by
Dreyer and Schotter (1980) and recently Strand et.al. (1997).
The design of the voting system for the IMF was naturally an important
focus of attention in the discussions surrounding the original Bretton Woods
conference in which sharp differences emerged between the British and the
Americans. The United States was particularly concerned to retain a national veto
for itself in any voting system which applied to the most important decisions
while the British preference was for simple majority voting. The American
position was criticised at the time by Keynes who pointed out that a voting
system which allowed one country a veto could equally give a veto to a small
group of smaller countries. We investigate this issue and are able to examine the
implications of this and find evidence that Keynes was right.
A secondary purpose of the present study is a methodological one of
examining the application of different indices used as measures of voting power.
Of the two classical indices used here neither has yet been shown to be generally
superior for real world analysis although they both possess equally plausible
theoretical foundations. In applications they often give results which are in
agreement to a good degree although in some cases they conflict considerably. It
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from analyses of observed voting behaviour.
4is hoped that as more applied work is done, and more experience gained, the
better able to make judgements on this question we will become. One issue which
is evident from the literature on power indices has been the difficulty of
calculating them in empirical applications with real data rather than simple
examples. This is because the voting power of each individual member depends
on not only its own voting weight but the complete configuration of the weights
of all the members which means this type of analysis requires a substantial
amount of computing resources. In this study we employ new algorithms for
computing the indices.
Questions we investigate in this paper are:
(1) How does the voting power of individual countries compare with their
nominal votes and how have these relations evolved over time?
 (2) In particular, to what extent is the degree of inequality in the
distribution of votes reflected in the distribution of voting power. Is voting
power more equally or more unequally distributed than voting weight, and
how has the inequality changed over time as new members have joined and
quotas increased?
(3) Have voting paradoxes arisen?
5(4) Are there important differences in the distribution of voting power
between the two main IMF decision-making bodies, the Board of
Governors and the Executive Board?
(5) Different types of decisions use different decision rules, some requiring
a special majority larger than a simple majority. We investigate the effect
of different decision rules on the distribution of power.
(6) How do the results given by the two measures of power compare?
The analysis in this paper is entirely in terms of formal voting power and
the formal constitution as laid down in the Articles of Agreement and its
amendments; we take the allocation of voting weight among the members at face
value. It is commonplace however to note that the organisation is in practice
controlled by the United States and the advanced industrial nations since their
combined voting weight gives them a majority over the developing countries. The
analysis presented here is not primarily concerned with such questions about the
power of informal groupings of countries, although the methodology can
obviously and usefully be employed to evaluate and compare the voting power of
6groupings which did not have an actual majority.4 We carry out one such
simulation by examining the implications of the countries of the European Union
forming a single grouping rather than voting independently.
We also note at this stage that in practice actual votes are rarely taken in
meetings of the IMF.5 Indeed they are deliberately avoided, especially by the
Executive Board, in order to avoid the element of confrontation which attends a
contested vote, with decisions being taken after arriving at a consensus. It might
therefore be suggested that an analysis of voting power is beside the point if all
decisions are taken by consensus. However, formal voting procedures may
fundamentally influence the de facto decision making process; power
relationships are fundamentally determined by relative voting strength and the
fact that votes are not taken in meetings is a reflection that these are well
                                  
4 For example it would be possible to use this approach to comment on the criticisms made by
developing countries that the distribution of voting power has been too heavily weighted towards
developed countries. This is a consequence of a fundamental aspect of the design of the IMF that
dominant voting power should be in the hands of creditor nations who provide the resources. Our
analysis should be able to illuminate the extent to which this aim is fulfilled in practice or whether the
“invisible weighting” of the United States and other large creditors skews the power distribution even
further away from the debtor countries.
This kind of analysis could be enriched by considering the power of individual countries which are
members of such groupings in terms of a two-stage process (a composed game) whereby voting is
considered first within the grouping then the grouping votes as a block within the organisation. This
would be feasible as an extension of the methodology used here but is beyond the scope of the  pres nt
study.
5 There is a parallel between voting and power distributions among the countries which are members of
IMF and those among shareholders of a public company (the Board of Governors corresponding to the
shareholders’ meeting) where analyses of power and control are conducted without regard for actual
voting patterns, but are in terms of potential votes which could theoretically be taken. There is an
important difference however in that weighted voting is a central feature of the day-to-day operations of
the IMF, in the Executive Directors as well as the Board of Governors
7understood and determine the basis on which a consensus is reached, a
framework within which bargaining takes place. It is also well known that, as in
other international organisations, the members of the IMF attach considerable
importance to questions surrounding the voting power of different members
(Zamora (1980)).
In the next section we give a formal description of the constitution of the
IMF. This is followed in section III by a description of the determination of
voting weights. The measurement of voting power by means of power indices is
described in section IV and algorithms for computing them are set out in section
V. The data is described in section VI, the results presented in section VII and
conclusions in section VII.
II. The Institutional Framework
According to the Articles of Agreement, the IMF has two decision-making
bodies: the Board of Governors and the Executive Board6. All p wers of the IMF
are vested in the Board of Governors, which may delegate to the Executive Board
authority to exercise all except certain specified reserved powers. The Executive
Board is responsible for the general operations of the IMF. The Board of
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8Governors has  delegated the maximum powers that the Articles permit to the
Executive Board.7
The powers exercised by the Board of Governors and expressly reserved
to it by the Articles refer to matters of a fundamental or political nature or which
may have a profound economic impact. The reserved powers  of the Board of
Governors include the power to: admit new members; require a member to
withdraw; approve a revision of quotas; determine the extent of delegation of
powers to the Executive Board; determine the distribution of the net income of
the Fund; determine the remuneration of Executive Directors; determine the
number of Executive Directors to be elected; decide appeals against decisions of
the Executive Board; make arrangements to co-operate with other international
organisations; decide to liquidate the Fund. Some powers are vested in the
Executive Board and the exercise of them does not depend on delegation from the
Board of Governors, such as the election of the Managing Director and the power
to suspend or terminate suspension of certain provisions. As well as exercising
the powers which are either vested in them or delegated to them, an important
role of the Executive Board is to make recommendations to the Board of
Governors about decisions which the latter is to take.
                                  
7 Since 1974 the effective policy making body has been the informal Interim Committee which consists
of ministers of the same countries which have seats on the Executive Board and meets twice per year.
However in this  study we are concerned with a pr ori voting power rather than the practice of policy
making.
9The Board of Governors comprises one governor (or one alternate
governor in the absence of the governor) appointed by each member country,
usually the minister of finance or the governor of the central bank. It meets once
per year; the Articles provide for the possibility of additional meetings and for a
vote to be taken without a meeting if the Executive Board judge it necessary.
Governors vote in person and there is no proxy voting. Each governor is entitled
to cast the number of votes of his country and may not cast fewer; his choice is to
cast the total votes or to abstain. Decisions, in the form of resolutions, are taken
by a majority of the votes cast except where the Articles require a Special
Majority for a particular decision. In all cases a quorum for a meeting is a
majority of the governors exercising not less than two thirds of the total voting
weight of the members.
The Executive Directors, who are generally officials or diplomats rather
than politicians, are appointed or elected by members of the Board of Governors.
Like the Board of Governors, the Executive Board, which functions in continuous
session, employs a system of weighted voting and therefore it is appropriate to
consider its composition and analyse the distribution of voting power among the
executive directors separately from the Board of Governors. The Articles provide
for not fewer than twelve executive directors, five of whom are appointed by the
five members having the largest quotas, and, in the original Articles, two elected
by the American republics not entitled to make an appointment and five elected
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by the other members. (Two additional directors are to be appointed by the two
members whose currencies have been sold by the Fund in the largest amounts in
the previous two years if they are not already entitled to appoint.) As the number
of members has increased the Articles have been amended to increase the number
of elected directors and in the 1994 election there were 19 elected directors, three
representing single-country electorates, China, Russia and Saudi Arabia and
sixteen elected by groups of countries.
Elections of executive directors are held every two years. There is a
minimum and a maximum percentage of the eligible votes that a nominee must
receive in order to be elected. In practice the minimum percentage results in most
cases in directors requiring the votes of more than one member in order to be
elected. The principle behind the requirement of a minimum percentage vote is to
encourage the formation of coalitions of members with common interests who
elect directors to represent them while the requirement of a maximum percentage
prevents too great disparities in the voting strength of individual elected directors.
An executive director casts the votes of those members who voted for him
as a unit and cannot split the vote. With the exception of the (Latin) American
republics, the Articles do not associate executive directors with predetermined
regional or other groupings; the groupings are assumed to be formed
endogenously as part of the election process. However the operation of the
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system over the years appears to have led to the formation of several such
groupings which have each tended to elect an executive director from the same
country over several elections and appear relatively stable. Members which
combine to form groupings engage in negotiations among themselves through
channels which are outside the IMF.8 However the process of election works,
some member countries (in particular Australia, Brazil, Belgium, Canada, China,
India, Italy, Netherlands) have provided executive directors practically
continuously since 1946.
The basic decision rule is that, except as specifically provided, all
decisions are made by a simple majority of the votes cast. This applies to both the
Board of Governors and the Executive Board and most of the decisions of the
Fund. (The rule is in terms to votes cast rather than total votes but this distinction
is ignored in this study.) For certain categories of decision, however, special
majorities, defined in terms of proportions of the total voting weight, whether the
votes are cast or not,  are required. These tend to be the most important types of
decision where a degree of consensus is required to make them effective.
                                  
8 It might therefore be considered appropriate to study the power relationships in the Executive Board in
terms of a two-stage voting process: first members vote by weighted voting within their group, second
their elected director votes their combined weight as a unit in the Executive Board. This two-stage
approach could have the effect of giving a greatly increased voting power to certain individual members
of the Executive Board whose voting weight in the Board of Governors was small. For example in 1994
Belgium had 2.1% of the votes in the Board of Governors, but was in a relatively dominant position,
with over 40% of the votes, in a grouping whose combined weight in the Executive Board was 5.1%.
This approach would require the groups to be well determined, to continue to exist regardless of the
outcome of the first stage, which cannot be assumed in all cases, and an assumption that there is a
similar process within each grouping, which cannot be assumed either. It is an interesting question
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The original Articles provided for a range of different special majority
requirements, as fractions of the total voting weight, from a simple majority to
four fifths, for different categories of decision but this was amended (after the
Second Amendment) effectively to two: 70 percent and 85 percent. After 1969 a
large number of types of decisions now require a special majority of 85 percent.
The introduction of this higher figure effectively allowed the United States to
keep its veto while reducing its contribution, but at the same time it meant that
groups of other countries, if they formed a bloc, such as the EU or the developing
countries could also have a veto. The adoption of a higher special majority
requirement was a move in the direction of unanimity and resulted in substantially
greater equality of power, as we show later.
The question of the size of majority required for a decision was a point of
disagreement between the British and American founders of the IMF. Keynes
was little interested in decision rules based on precise formulae and advocated
that all decisions be taken by simple  majority,  in contrast to the Americans who
insisted on designing voting rules which guaranteed them a veto, with 33 percent
of the votes. Keynes addressed the question in his maiden speech to the House of
Lords (1943a): ". . . the requirement in the American plan for a four fifths
majority will be found, if the paper is read carefully, to relate not to all matters by
any means, but only to a few major issues. Whether on second thoughts any one
                                                                                                      
which is not considered here and remains for future work.
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would wish to allow a negative veto to any small group remains to be seen. For
example, the American proposals might allow the gold-producing countries to
prevent the United States from increasing the gold value of the dollar, even in
circumstances where the deluge of gold was obviously becoming excessive; and
in some ways, by reason of their greater rigidity, the American proposals would
involve a somewhat greater surrender of national sovereignty than do our own."
He also wrote (1943b): "I disagree strongly, on non-economic grounds, of the
individual country veto-power unless it is granted to all countries regardless of
their quotas . . . . the 80 percent majority rule would limit the power of the US
with respect to changes it may desire in an existing status as much as it would
increase its power to stop undesired changes."
III. Voting Weights
Every member of the IMF has a quota expressed in US dollars which is its
subscription to the resources of the organisation and also determines its voting
weight. The votes allotted to a member are equal to a basic two hundred and fifty
plus one vote for each hundred thousand dollars of quota. Thus voting weight
varies linearly according to the size of the quota rather than proportionately. This
is one important difference with a business corporation where votes are strictly
proportional to contributions to equity capital. The existence of the 250 “basic”
votes which every member has independently of its quota re lect concerns
expressed at the Br tton Woods conference. It was felt that the radical move (in
14
an international organisation) of adopting a system of weighted voting for the
IMF, where the weights reflected economic and financial factors, should be
tempered by the political consideration of the traditional equality of states in
international law. To have allocated votes in proportion to quotas would have
meant too close a similarity with a business corporation and might have given too
high a degree of control to a small group of member countries.
The Articles do not provide for an increase in basic votes when quotas
increase and for most countries their voting weight has become more closely
proportional to their quota as the latter has increased over the years. The
proportion of total votes represented by the combined basic votes has accordingly
fallen substantially over the years (see Table 1) from a high of over 14% in 1956
to 3% in 1996. This decline has been in spite of the increase in the  number of
members, many of which are developing countries with very small quotas.
Table 1. “Basic” Votes as a Percentage of Total Votes
Number of
members
Total basic votes Total votes Percentage basic
votes
1946 39 9750 84475 11.54
1956 58 14500 101280 14.32
1966 103 25750 217657 11.83
1976 128 32000 324114 9.87
1986 149 37250 930300 4.00
1996 179 44750 1493331 3.00
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However for the great majority of members their basic votes have become
insignificant. For example for Belgium the share of its total voting weight
represented by basic votes has fallen from 10% in 1946 to 0.7% in 1996, for
Mexico it has fallen from 21.7% to 1.4% over the same period.
IV.  The Measurement of Voting Power
In a weighted voting body the formal power a member exercises is not, in
general, the same as its numerical voting strength; this is a general feature of
weighted voting and does not depend on the nature of informal relations among
the members, such as groupings or parties or their preferences. We can examine
this relationship by employing the method of voting power indices based on a
simple abstract definition of power.
The approach is in principle very simple. Power is defined in such a way
that it can be thought of as being shared among the members. Given a voting rule
in terms of the majority requirement for winning a vote, the winning quota, such
as a simple majority or a larger special majority, then, if a member’s votes exceed
the quota, it obviously has all the power; otherwise power is divided among the
members on the basis of their ability to influence decisions. This requires a
precise definition to lead to a quantitative measure.
The two classical power indices which are used here (and described in, for
example, Owen (1995) and Straffin (1994)) are both based on the idea that a
16
member’s power is its capacity to change a vote from losing to winning by using
its votes. In general its share of the power is defined as the number of times it can
do this expressed as a proportion of the total number of times that any member
can do it. Thus the approach does not take any account of the extent to which the
voting body itself is able to take decisions; members of a voting body may be
powerless because the body itself is incapable of making decisions. The method
is confined to the analysis of power relationships among the members relative to
those decisions which are made at least in principle.
Although the two classical power indices employ the same basic concept
of a swing whereby a member, by joining a coalition changes it from losing to
winning, they are mathematically distinct since they employ different coalition
models. The Banzhaf index (Banzhaf (1965)) is based on considering coalitions
as combinations of members in the sense of a list arranged in no particular order;
they might be arranged alphabetically, or in any other arbitrary order - the
ordering is irrelevant to the coalition. A member’s power index is then the
number of such coalitions it can swing from losing to winning, expressed as a
proportion of all such swings when all members are considered.
The Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik (1954)) on the other hand,
counts coalitions on the basis not only of swings, but also the order in which
members are listed. Thus, given that a member is able to swing a vote, the index
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takes into account the number of orderings of both the members of the winning
coalition and the members not in the coalition - a re-ordering of the same
members is counted as a different swing. The index is defined by expressing this
number as a proportion of the number of orderings of all members.
For example, consider a voting body with 10 members. Suppose we wish
to measure the power of member i. Let us consider the effect of the size of the
coalition on the measurement of power according to the two indices. Consider
two swings, coalitions which are losing until i joins, one of 4 members and one of
7 members. The Banzhaf index treats these two swings equally: each counts as
one swing. The Shapley-Shubik index, however, attaches very different
importance to them. For the coalition of size 4, the number of orderings of its
members and the remaining 5 members is 4!5! = 2,880. The contribution of this
swing to the index is then 2880/10! = 2880/3628800 = 0.000793. For the other
coalition, however, its contribution to the power index is 7!2!/10! =
10,080/3628800 = 0.002778. Thus the number of members in a swing coalition
has a considerable importance to the computation of the Shapley-S ubik index,
cases where the winning coalition and its complement are relatively equal being
given much less weight.
Despite being so different in the way they count swings, the two indices
have given results which have not been very different in some applications.
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However they have given results which have differed considerably in others.
There is no clear guidance from the literature on the relative merits of the two
indices. While political scientists and lawyers have tended to prefer the Banzha
index and criticised the coalition model underlying the Shapley-Shubik index,
mathematicians and game theorists have tended to the reverse preference ordering
since the Shapley-Shubik index has been shown to uniquely satisfy certain
axioms. Both indices give rise to a power distribution among the members of the
legislature. In addition, however, the Shapl y-Shubik index can be interpreted
directly as the probability of swing given its coalition model, so that power can
be thought of as the probability that each member swings the vote, whereas the
Banzhaf index cannot. Evaluating the probability of a swing for each player
within the Banzhaf coalition model gives indices which do not sum to unity and
therefore must be normalised to give a power distribution9.
One factor which has to some extent limited the study of power indices in
empirical applications has been the difficulty of computing them when the
number of members of the voting body is moderate or large. In this study we
employ algorithms which enable the approach to be used to study the two bodies
of the IMF. Indices are computed for the Board of Governors, which has a large
number of members, between 39 in 1946 and 179 in 1996, using a modified
                                  
9 Authors who have adressed the question of the respective merits of the indices from various angles
include Brams (1975), Leech (1990), Roth (1977), Strafffin (1977), Felsenthal and Machover (1995).
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multilinear extensions algorithm. Power relations within the Executive Board are
studied using a direct enumeration algorithm. These are described below.
V. Computation of the Voting Power Indices
We characterise a voting body by the number of its members, n, their
voting weights, w1, 2, . . ., wi, . . . ,wn and a decision rule in terms of a quota10.,
q In  the present case the weights are proportions so that w i  = 1å . The quota
is the size of majority required for a decision; since any voting body usually has a
decision rule which is intended to produce a clear decision, as here, we require
q1/2.
The power index of member i is the value for player i of the corresponding
simple game {q; w1, . . . , wn}. The set of all players is denoted N. For member i,
a swing is a coalition represented by a set, S ,
S Í  N, such that i ÏS, where
 
jÎS
å wj < q   and   
jÎS
å wj + wi  q. (1)
The Banzhaf power index, denoted bi , is the ratio of the number of swings
for member i, hi = 
S
å 1 , to the total number of swings for all members,
bi = hi/å hi . (2)
                                  
10 This is here used as a technical term and should not be confused with IMF quotas.
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The Shapley-Shubik index is defined in terms of the number of orderings of
members for each swing. Letting qi = 
S
å s!(n-s-1)! ,where s is the number of
members of the set S, and the summation is taken over swings, the index is
defined as gi = qi/n! . More usually the expression is written:
gi = 
S
å
s!(n - s - 1)!
n!
. (3)
Two algorithms are used to calculate the bi ‘s and the gi ‘s in this study: (1)
Direct Enumeration, and (2) a Modified MLE Approximation. The details of
these two algorithms are described fully in Leech (1998). The Direct Enumeration
algorithm finds every subset M ÍN and tests for a swing for each member. This
algorithm evaluates the power index directly by counting swings but has the
disadvantage that it is compute-intensive. The time taken to test all subsets of N
increases exponentially with n, since the number of subsets is 2n, computation
time approximately doubling every time n increases by 1. However it has been
found to work well for moderate-sized games such as the IMF Executive Board,
for which n24. For games much larger than this the computing time required
would be prohibitive. An advantage of this algorithm is that it can be generalised
to compute values of general n-person games, such as Shapley values, since it
does not rely on exploiting the special features of Simple Games. For the Board
of Governors we use an approximation method which we have called the
Modified Multilinear Extension method. This is a development of an approach
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due to Owen (1972) who addressed the question of the difficulty of computing
values for large games and proposed a method of approximation based on the
Multilinear Extension and the use of the central limit theorem. Our algorithm is a
combination of this with the direct enumeration approach and is considerably
more accurate than Owen's MLE approximation method which was unsatisfactory
because of the large voting weight of the United States.
VI. The Data
Separate data sets have been used to analyse power relations in the Board
of Governors and the Executive Board. The former consists of percentage voting
weights for each member and every year; the latter consists of the voting weights
held by each executive director each year.
The voting weights for the Board of Governors for the first twenty six
years were taken from Gold (1972) which lists all the voting weights for every
member country and every year. The weights for later years (and for the
Executive Board in all years) have been calculated using figures taken from an
appendix to the IMF Annual Report for each year. (An example - slightly
abridged - is in the Appendix to this paper.) The figures presented in the Annual
Reports describe the way in which the voting weights of the individual executive
directors have been determined through the voting system and therefore which
member countries are represented by each director. In almost every year certain
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countries have been excluded because they did not participate in elections of
directors;  China and South Africa have not infrequently been in this group. Also
certain new members have often not participated in the elections or been unable
to do so because they joined the organisation too late. Such countries have been
members and therefore had a vote in the Board of Governors but their v ting
weight has not been represented by an executive director.
In order to make the figures complete it has therefore been necessary to
adjust the reported figures by including these countries. There is therefore a
difference between the data for the two bodies in that the percentage voting
weights for the Board of Governors sum to 100 while the total for the Executive
Board is often less than that. We have used these figures to make a separate
analysis of voting power in the Board of Governors for each year by the Modified
MLE Approximation method. This method was employed because of the large
number of members which made the exact Direct Enumeration Algorithm
infeasible. The Direct Enumeration Algorithm was used to analyse the Executive
Board however because the number of members of that body has always been
small enough for it to be computationally feasible.
VII. Results
A separate analysis has been carried out for each voting body for each year
of the history of the IMF. This approach gives a power distribution for any year
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which is of interest as well as enabling us to trace its evolution over time.
Separate analyses are given for the two levels of the majority quota required for
ordinary decisions (where a 50% majority is required) and special majorities
(where the required quota was 80% until 1969 and 85% in later years)11. We
present results for both 1946 and 1996 - taken as the two extreme years in terms
of the number of members and the concentration of voting weight - in numerical
form and then the evolution of voting power over time graphically. We have also
examined the effect of the size of special majority over its whole theoretical range
between 50% and 100% for the Executive Boards of 1946 and 1996.
VII(a) Ordinary Decisions
Table 2 presents the results for 1946 for ordinary decisions for both the
Executive Board and the Board of Governors. For each body the table lists the
voting weight and both power indices for each member. The figures for the five
largest members which appointed executive directors are presented side-by-side
for comparison but the other executive directors were all elected by groups of
countries. Where a group had an apparently dominant member (of which the
elected director was a national) we have identified that country in parentheses,
although we cannot necessarily assume that the figures refer to the voting weight
or power of the country. These figures are presented side-by-side with those for
                                  
11 The First Amendment to the Articles, raising the special majority to 85%, became effective in July
1969 but since the data point each year is April 30, we have taken it as being in force from 1970
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the country in the Board of Governors. The other directors, representing groups
without any apparently dominant country are denoted D9 etc and in these cases
there is no implication of a link between them and the member country alongside
it in the Board of Governors.
In both bodies the two indices are in broad agreement about the qualitative
nature of the power distribution but differ in the quantitative values of the indices.
Both indices give the USA a lot more power than its weight and all the other
members less power than weight. The only slight exception to this is the
executive director with the least weight, which we have labelled D1212, has more
power than weight, and the same power as a group with a larger weight led by
Belgium. The USA had about 33 percent of the voting weight and either 49 or 43
percent of the voting power (depending on the index) in the Executive Board. In
the Board of Governors the power discrepancy is slightly larger, the USA’s
power index being either 54 or 44 percent.
                                                                                                      
onwards.
12 In fact representing a group consisting of Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, Iran, Iraq,Philippines.
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Table 2: Power Indices for 1946 (Ordinary Decisions, q=50%)
Executive Board Board of Governors
Votes Bz IndexSS-Index Votes Bz IndexSS-Index
USA 33.22 48.77 43.18 USA 33.14 54.27 44.32
UK 15.86 8.59 12.51 UK 15.83 5.63 12.58
France 6.58 5.11 5.54 France 5.67 4.37 4.90
India 5.09 4.21 4.33 India 5.08 3.97 4.35
China 6.88 5.44 6.00 China 6.87 4.97 6.07
(Canada) 4.79 3.87 3.94 Canada 3.88 3.07 3.27
(Netherland
)
5.09 4.21 4.33 Netherlands 3.58 2.84 3.00
(Belgium) 3.72 3.54 3.48 Belgium 2.99 2.39 2.49
D9 5.48 4.66 4.94 Brazil 2.09 1.68 1.73
D10 5.23 4.43 4.63 Czechoslov. 1.79 1.44 1.48
D11 4.61 3.65 3.64 Poland 1.79 1.44 1.48
D12 3.46 3.54 3.48 South Africa1.49 1.20 1.23
Sum 100 100 100 Mexico 1.37 1.10 1.13
Exec.Dirs 12 Denmark 1.11 0.89 0.92
Yugoslavia 1.02 0.82 0.84
Chile 0.9 0.72 0.74
Colombia 0.9 0.72 0.74
Cuba 0.9 0.72 0.74
Norway 0.9 0.72 0.74
Egypt 0.84 0.68 0.69
Greece 0.78 0.63 0.64
Iran 0.6 0.48 0.50
Peru 0.6 0.48 0.50
Philippines 0.48 0.39 0.40
Uruguay 0.48 0.39 0.40
Bolivia 0.42 0.34 0.35
Luxembourg0.42 0.34 0.35
Iraq 0.39 0.31 0.32
Ethiopia 0.37 0.30 0.31
Costa Rica 0.36 0.29 0.30
DominicanR 0.36 0.29 0.30
Ecuador 0.36 0.29 0.30
Guatemala 0.36 0.29 0.30
El Salvador 0.33 0.27 0.27
Honduras 0.33 0.27 0.27
Nicaragua 0.32 0.26 0.26
Paraguay 0.32 0.26 0.26
Iceland 0.31 0.25 0.26
Panama 0.3 0.24 0.25
Sum 100 100 99.97
Members 39
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By contrast the picture for the United Kingdom is quite different despite
the country’s large voting weight in 1946 - almost 16% - half the votes of the
United States and much more than any other member. The indices both give the
UK  a substantial power deficiency: in the Executive Board, it only had either
8.59% or 12.51% of the power; it had even less power in the Board of
Governors, the Banzhaf index giving it less than 6%. The figures for France are
less extreme although it still had less power than voting weight in both bodies13.
Comparing the indices for the countries which dominated their groupings in the
Executive Board (Canada, Netherlands and Belgium) in both bodies suggests that
their executive directors had considerably more power than their governors in the
respective bodies. The effect comes largely through the concentration of voting
weight, however, rather than being especially a property of the power indices.
Table 3 is the equivalent analysis for 199614. The general picture is the
same in qualitative terms as it was in 1946, with the United States having an
excess of power over weight in both bodies and every other member country
having a power deficiency. Apart from that for the USA which remains
substantial, the difference between power and weight is generally fairly small.
The USA had almost 18% of the votes and 21% or 23% of the power in the
                                  
13 There is a large discrepancy between the voting weight of France in the two bodies, but these figures
are correct according to Gold (1972) and the IMF Annual Report for 1946.
14 Using the data in the Appendix. Because of the large numbers of countries not all of them have been
listed.
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Executive Board and 27% or 21% in the Board of Governors. Whil  the total
power is a lot less than in the past, the power discrepancy is still substantial in
relation to the voting weight. The effect of the voting system in the Executive
Board appears to have had a substantial effect in enhancing the power of some
countries, in particular Australia, Belgium and Netherlands.
Table 3. Power Indices for 1996 (Ordinary Decisions, q=50%)
Executive Directors Board of Governors
Votes Bz Index SS-Index Votes Bz Index SS-Index
USA 17.78 23.28 21.33 USA 17.78 27.00 21.02
UK 4.98 4.71 4.91 UK 4.98 4.36 4.91
France 4.98 4.71 4.91 France 4.98 4.36 4.91
Germany 5.54 5.24 5.51 Germany 5.54 4.80 5.49
Japan 5.54 5.24 5.51 Japan 5.54 4.80 5.49
China 2.28 2.16 2.20 China 2.28 2.04 2.19
Saudi Arabia 3.45 3.27 3.34 SaudiArabi3.45 3.07 3.35
(India) 2.58 2.44 2.49 India 2.06 1.84 1.97
(Canada) 3.72 3.52 3.61 Canada 2.91 2.60 2.81
(Netherland) 4.88 4.62 4.81 Netherland2.32 2.07 2.23
(Belgium) 5.09 4.82 5.03 Belgium 2.09 1.87 2.00
LatinAm(Brazil) 2.63 2.49 2.54 Brazil 1.47 1.32 1.40
LatinAm(Mexico)4.31 4.08 4.21
(Italy) 4.02 3.81 3.91 Italy 3.09 2.75 2.99
(Australia) 3.29 3.12 3.19 Australia 1.58 1.42 1.51
Scandinavia 3.47 3.29 3.36 ... ... ... ...
LatinAm(Arg.) 2.14 2.02 2.06 ... ... ... ...
Africa(exBritish) 2.5 2.37 2.41 ... ... ... ...
Africa(exFrench)1.34 1.27 1.28 ... ... ... ...
D20 3.19 3.02 3.09 ... ... ... ...
D21 2.9 2.75 2.80 ... ... ... ...
D22 2.8 2.65 2.70 ... ... ... ...
D23 2.76 2.61 2.66 ... ... ... ...
D24 2.65 2.51 2.56 ... ... ... ...
Sum 98.82 100 100.43 Sum 100 100 100.006
Exec Dirs 24 Members 179
Note: Votes do not sum to 100 in the Executive Directors,
because members who did not cast their votes were not
represented.
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VII(b) Special Majorities
Tables 4 and 5 show the analyses for decisions requiring special majorities
in the same two years. These decisions concern more fundamental matters and
therefore these results might be considered as containing more information about
the true distribution of power. They are much more difficult to interpret because
the two power indices used disagree qualitatively in many cases and also there
are differences in the pattern in the two years. In general we would expect the
effect of a higher majority requirement to be to make the distribution of power
more equal15. That has undoubtedly been the effect on the 1946 data for the
Executive Board as measured by the Banz af index which indicates considerably
less power for the United States and more power for all the other directors. The
power of the USA drops to 16.9% (compared with 48.8% with respect to
ordinary decisions) and that of the UK is almost the same16. The power
distribution given by the Shapley-Shubik index, by contrast, is somewhat
different, giving less power than weight to every director except the UK; these
effects however are moderate. The pattern in the Board of Governors is similar to
that for the Executive Board for both indices.
                                  
15 Theoretically, increasing the quota - ultimately to unity - should make all the indices converge on the
same value 1/39= 2.56% in the 1946 Board of Governors, 0.56% in the 1996 Board of Governors, etc.
16 It is interesting that the power index for the UK is now almost equal to that of the USA. This is not
surprising since if the quota had been 85% then the two countries would have had the same power,
swings for a member with a weight of 33.22% being the same as swings for one with 15.86%.
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The results for 1996 in Table 5 are similarly inconclusive. The power
distributions given by the two indices are conflicting in qualitative terms: that for
the Banzhaf index being a lot more equal than the distribution of voting weight,
while that for the Shapley-Shubik index appears to be slightly more unequal. The
pattern is similar in both bodies. The main overall conclusion from this analysis is
therefore that, at high levels of the majority quota, it matters greatly which index
is used. It is necessary therefore to try to form a view on the relative merits of the
indices.
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Table 4. Power Indices for 1946 (Special Majorities, q=80%)
Executive Board Board of Governors
Votes Bz Index SS-Index Votes Bz Index SS-Index
USA 33.22 16.90 31.94 USA 33.14 13.391 32.10
UK 15.86 16.52 21.04 UK 15.83 13.389 21.06
France 6.58 9.03 6.26 France 5.67 8.25 5.32
India 5.09 6.71 4.90 India 5.08 7.34 4.78
China 6.88 9.94 6.79 China 6.87 10.01 6.50
(Canada) 4.79 6.06 4.52 Canada 3.88 5.57 3.66
(Netherland)5.09 6.71 4.90 Netherlands 3.58 5.13 3.36
(Belgium) 3.72 4.26 2.63 Belgium 2.99 4.26 2.78
D9 5.48 7.23 5.20 Brazil 2.09 2.98 1.90
D10 5.23 7.10 5.13 Czechoslov. 1.79 2.55 1.61
D11 4.61 5.68 4.29 Poland 1.79 2.55 1.61
D12 3.46 3.87 2.40 South Africa 1.49 2.12 1.33
Sum 100 100 100.00 Mexico 1.37 1.95 1.22
Exec. Dirs. 12 Denmark 1.11 1.58 0.98
Yugoslavia 1.02 1.45 0.90
Chile 0.9 1.28 0.79
Colombia 0.9 1.28 0.79
Cuba 0.9 1.28 0.79
Norway 0.9 1.28 0.79
Egypt 0.84 1.19 0.74
Greece 0.78 1.11 0.69
Iran 0.6 0.85 0.53
Peru 0.6 0.85 0.53
Philippines 0.48 0.68 0.42
Uruguay 0.48 0.68 0.42
Bolivia 0.42 0.60 0.37
Luxembourg 0.42 0.60 0.37
Iraq 0.39 0.55 0.34
Ethiopia 0.37 0.53 0.32
Costa Rica 0.36 0.51 0.31
Dominican R.0.36 0.51 0.31
Ecuador 0.36 0.51 0.31
Guatemala 0.36 0.51 0.31
El Salvador 0.33 0.47 0.29
Honduras 0.33 0.47 0.29
Nicaragua 0.32 0.45 0.28
Paraguay 0.32 0.45 0.28
Iceland 0.31 0.44 0.27
Panama 0.3 0.43 0.26
Sum 100 100 99.95
Members 39
Note: Votes do not precisely agree in the two bodies because of the omission of
the votes of Denmark from the Executive Board.
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VII(c) Historical Trends
Figures 1 to 12 show historical trends in power as measured by the indices
for the G5 countries. Similar graphs could be drawn for any member country.
Besides the values of the two power indices we also show the corresponding
power ratios; for each index this is the ratio of the index to the voting weight. A
power ratio provide a simple indication of the extent to which power differs from
Table 5. Power Indices for 1996 (Special Majorities, q=85%)
Executive Board Board of Governors
Votes Bz Index SS-Index Votes Bz IndexSS-Index
USA 17.78 6.20 18.60 USA 17.78 3.12 19.06
UK 4.98 5.25 5.04 UK 4.98 3.11 5.14
France 4.98 5.25 5.04 France 4.98 3.11 5.14
Germany 5.54 5.51 5.72 Germ 5.54 3.11 5.78
Japan 5.54 5.51 5.72 Japan 5.54 3.11 5.78
China 2.28 2.96 2.21 China 2.28 2.70 2.24
Saudi 3.45 4.18 3.52 SaudiAr 3.45 3.03 3.46
(India) 2.58 3.29 2.49 India 2.06 2.57 2.02
(Can) 3.72 4.44 3.81 Canada 2.91 2.93 2.89
(Neth) 4.88 5.19 4.96 Netherland 2.32 2.72 2.28
(Belg) 5.09 5.31 5.17 Belgium 2.09 2.59 2.05
LA(Brazil) 2.63 3.35 2.56 Brazil 1.47 2.06 1.42
LA(Mex.) 4.31 4.85 4.37
(Ital) 4.02 4.66 4.17 Italy 3.09 2.97 3.08
(Aus) 3.29 4.01 3.24 Austral 1.58 2.19 1.53
Scan 3.47 4.20 3.55 ... ... ... ...
LA(Arg.) 2.14 2.79 2.06 ... ... ... ...
Af(Br.) 2.5 3.20 2.42 ... ... ... ...
Af(Fr.) 1.34 1.87 1.34 ... ... ... ...
D1 3.19 3.92 3.10 ... ... ... ...
D2 2.9 3.66 2.87 ... ... ... ...
D3 2.8 3.53 2.75 ... ... ... ...
D4 2.76 3.50 2.72 ... ... ... ...
D5 2.65 3.37 2.59 ... ... ... ...
Sum 98.82 100 100 Sum 100 100.00 100.00
Ex.Dirs. 24 Members 179
Note: Votes do not sum to 100 in the Executive Directors, because
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weight, the power discrepancy. It can be used to indicate transparency of the
voting system: where power and weight are equal the power ratio is equal to
unity. (In our case the power ratios have been normalised to 100 so that the
power discrepancy is expressed as a percentage). Figures 1 to 6 show the results
for ordinary decisions and Figures 7 to 12 those requiring special majorities.
Figure 1 shows the results for the United States: 1(a) shows the voting
weight and two power ratios for every year in the history of the organisation for
the Executive Board, 1(b) the corresponding power ratios, 1(c) the weights and
indices for the Board of Governors, and 1(d) the corresponding power ratios. We
see that power has been consistently above weight in every year. As the weight
has declined there has been a corresponding decline in power. The power ratios
have fallen slowly but they are still both considerably above 100. The Shapley-
Shubik index gives a positive power discrepancy of at least 20% (which is down
from over 30% in the 1940s), and the effect according to the Banzhaf index is
even greater. The results are broadly similar for both bodies although there is
generally a greater power discrepancy in the Board of Governors than in the
Executive Board. There is no evidence of any voting paradoxes.
Figure 2 shows the results for the UK. There was initially in the 1940s a
great excess of weight over power in both bodies: there was a power discrepancy
of either almost 20% or 40% in the Executive Board and up to almost 60% in the
Board of Governors. This is perhaps somewhat surprising in view of the very
large voting weight of the UK at that time. Over time the power discrepancy has
declined: the Shapley-Shubik index has been virtually equal to weight since the
mid 1960s, although the Banzhaf index has continued to indicate a power deficit
(substantial in the Board of Governors). There have been some voting paradoxes,
although small in magnitude. For example in 1947 voting weight rose but power
according to both indices fell in both bodies. In 1966 weight increased and the
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two indices went in opposite directions in the Board of Governors, the Banzhaf
index falling and the S apley-Shubik index rising. A number of other similar
changes have occurred but they are all small in magnitude.
Figure 3 shows the trends for France. The power indices track the voting
weight, at first falling until the mid 1960s then rising slightly. There has always
been a small negative power discrepancy in both bodies. Small  voting paradoxes
occurred at several points according to one or the other index: 1947, 1957, 1976,
1981 (in the Executive Board). Figure 4 shows the results for Germany which
joined the IMF in 1953 and had its own executive director from 1955. The
general pattern is one of fluctuating voting weight with the power indices
following fairly closely, with a relatively small power discrepancy tending to get
smaller over time. Some small voting paradoxes occurred in the Executive Board
in 1959, 1970 and 1976. Figure 5 shows the results for Japan, which joined in
1953 and has had its own director since 1971. The results show power to have
been only slightly less than weight in every year. Figure 6 shows the power ratios
for each index and each body. The diagram brings out the contrast between the
power of the United States and the other G5 countries. Although the power ratios
for the latter have converged on something only slightly below 100, that of the
former has remained well above. This effect is produced by both the indices; only
its size is always greater according to the Banzhaf index than the Shapley-Shubik
index.
The results shown in Figures 1 to 6 are clear. However they are all for
ordinary decisions requiring a majority of 50% of the votes. The results are much
less clear when the analysis is repeated for decisions requiring special majorities.
Figures 7 to 12 show historical trends for the two power indices for these cases.
The majorities assumed are of 80% up to 1969 and 85% thereafter Figure 7
shows the US results. The Shapley-Shubik power ratio fluctuates around 100 in a
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range of +20% while the Banzhaf index give a large power discrepancy. Both
power ratios fell in 1970 after the special majority was increased to 85%.
Figure 8 shows the picture for the UK with conflicting results according to
the two indices. Generally the Shapley-Shubik index gives a positive power
discrepancy and the Banzhaf index a negative one but these are quantitatively
small effects. Figure 9 shows France where again there is a tendency for the
indices to conflict. The Banzhaf index gives a positive power discrepancy.
Similar results are found for Germany  and Japan in the next two figures. All
power atios, however with the exception of that for the Banzhaf index for the
United States have converged to close to 100 (Figure 12).
VII(d) The Effect of the Majority Requirement
The results we have described show the sensitivity of the power indices to
not only the choice of index used but also the majority quota, q. It is therefore of
considerable importance to investigate further the effect of variation in the latter
on the results. We know that increasing the value of q makes the power
distribution more equal until in the limit when q = 100% all power indices are
equal for all members. How quickly this convergence takes place is an interesting
question whose answer might help us to understand the comparative behaviour of
the different indices. This experiment may also provide evidence on the question
of the best majority requirement to build into the voting rules which occupied the
founders of the IMF and thereby a test the assertions of Keynes quoted earlier in
section II.
Figure 13 Shows the results of the exact analysis of the Executive Board
for the years 1946 and 1996. Power indices have been computed for values of q
between 50 and 100, at intervals of 5%. Figures 13(a) and 13(b) show the
resulting graphs for the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices using the 1946 data
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and 13(c) and 13(d) those for the 1996 data. Table 6 shows the same information
for the United States and the second  largest member, the UK in 1946 and
Germany in 1996. The results for 1946 show that Keynes was right as far as the
power of the United States was concerned in that its power diminished strongly
with q for large values of q. For smaller values however the picture as before
depends on the index; the Shapley-Shubik index indicates that US power does not
vary monotonically with q, but increases at first to a maximum at q=70 before
falling steadily. On the other hand both graphs for the United Kingdom show an
increase to a maximum then a decrease. For the other executive directors the
relationship is relatively flat with little sensitivity of power to q except close to
the limit. The results for the 1996 Executive Board show broadly similar results
for the United States as for 1946 except that the relationship is now monotone for
both indices; the graphs for the other directors show little sensitivity of the power
index to q. Comparing the results for the two indices we see that the Banzhaf
index appears to be the more sensitive to the value of q. The Shapley-Shubik
index tends to show relatively little change as q increases until quite close to the
limit when it converges more rapidly.
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Table 6. The Effect of Changing the Majority Requirement
1946
USA UK USA UK
Votes: 33.22 15.86 33.22 15.86
Majority q: Banzhaf Index SS Index
50 48.77 8.59 43.18 12.51
55 45.93 10.61 43.40 12.78
60 39.65 15.09 43.48 12.99
65 32.71 19.10 43.70 13.91
70 26.45 20.51 45.38 15.53
75 21.14 19.21 38.68 18.08
80 16.90 16.52 31.94 21.04
85 13.73 13.73 25.25 25.25
90 11.36 11.36 18.79 18.79
95 9.62 9.62 11.36 11.36
100 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33
1996
USA Germany USA Germany
Votes: 17.78 5.54 17.78 5.54
Majority q: Banzhaf Index SS Index
50 23.28 5.24 21.33 5.51
55 21.26 5.41 21.24 5.47
60 17.48 5.69 21.15 5.48
65 13.81 5.92 21.01 5.52
70 10.94 6.01 20.91 5.50
75 8.86 5.96 20.80 5.44
80 7.34 5.80 20.31 5.50
85 6.20 5.51 18.60 5.72
90 5.32 5.11 12.75 6.23
95 4.57 4.57 6.92 6.92
100 4.17 4.17 4.17 4.17
VII(e) The Effect of the European Union Voting as a Single Block
Another use of the methodology of power indices is to analyse the effects
of possible fundamental changes in the voting system. One obvious scenario
which it is interesting to consider here is that of the European Union becoming a
single member of the IMF replacing its fifteen individual member countries. The
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EU would then be the largest member of the IMF with 28.84% of the voting
weight.
It would be difficult to examine the implications of this change for power
relations within the Executive Board because in order to do that it would be
necessary not just to aggregate the votes of the EU countries into a single large
block, but also to specify implications for the votes cast by the elected directors.
Rather than attempt to do that we have therefore done the analysis on the Board
of Governors by simply elimating the individual members of the EU and replacing
them by a single aggregated block vote. The results of the analysis using the data
for 1996 and a majority quota of 50% are shown in Table 7. The table shows the
voting weights and power indices for all members who would then have at least
1% of the votes. It also shows the effective redistribution of power inherent in
this voting allocation, the difference between the respective power index and
voting weight and also the change in the values of the power indices from the
situation existing before the combination of the EU votes. The results are also
displayed graphically in Figure 14.
From Table 7 and Figure 14(a) the effect of the EU countries forming a
block is dramatic but its details, again, depend on the index used. The power of
the EU is considerably greater than its nominal 28.84%, both indices giving a
value of almost 40%. Both indices agree that much of this is at the expense of the
United States and Japan. The Banzhaf index gives the power of the United States
as under 6%, compared with a voting weight of 17.78% a very large power
discrepancy; however the effect obtained using the Shapley-Shubik index is much
smaller, though also negative. Both indices also give a very small negative power
discrepancy for Japan and very small effects for all other members. There is a
different pattern of results for the two indices. The general pattern of power
discrepancies given by the Banzhaf index is one where the EU and the smaller
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members gains at the expense of the two large but not largest members, USA and
Japan. That obtained using the Shapley-Shubik index on the other hand is that
every member loses except the largest, the EU.
In Table 7 we also give the changes in the power indices resulting from the
combination of the EU countries: these are the differences in the power indices
compared with those for the analysis reported in Table 3 where the fifteen EU
states are treated separately. These changes are shown graphically in Figure 14(b)
and (c). The United States loses a lot of power: 21% according to the Banzhaf
index (but much less, 5% according to the Shapley-Shubik index). The effects on
other members are small in absolute terms, though some of them are non-
negligible in comparison with voting weight. The direction of the change is
different for the two indices. According to the Banzhaf index the effect is to
restore either partially or completely the previous power deficiency for these
countries; according to the Shapley-Shubik index the effect is to reduce th ir
power to less than it had been before.
We can therefore conclude that the main effect of the formation of an EU
voting block would be to significantly reallocate power away from the USA in
favour of the EU but we cannot draw a clear conclusion about its precise effects
on the other members, except that they will be small.
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Table 7: Effect of an EU Block Vote, Board Governors,1996
Weigh
t
Bz
Index
SS Index Differ-
ence Bz
Differ-
ence SS
Change
* Bz
Change*
SS
EU 28.84 39.68 36.04 10.84 7.20
USA 17.78 5.92 15.97 -11.86 -1.81 -21.08 -5.05
Japan 5.54 5.22 5.28 -0.32 -0.26 0.42 -0.21
Saudi Arabia 3.45 3.56 3.17 0.11 -0.28 0.49 -0.18
Russia 2.91 3.00 2.65 0.09 -0.26 0.40 -0.16
Canada 2.91 3.00 2.65 0.09 -0.26 0.40 -0.16
China 2.28 2.35 2.06 0.07 -0.22 0.31 -0.13
India 2.06 2.12 1.86 0.06 -0.20 0.28 -0.11
Switzerland 1.67 1.72 1.50 0.05 -0.17 0.24 -0.10
Australia 1.58 1.63 1.42 0.05 -0.16 0.21 -0.09
Brazil 1.47 1.52 1.32 0.05 -0.15 0.20 -0.08
Venezuela 1.32 1.36 1.18 0.04 -0.14 0.19 -0.08
Mexico 1.19 1.23 1.06 0.04 -0.13 0.17 -0.07
Argentina 1.05 1.08 0.94 0.03 -0.11 0.15 -0.06
Indonesia 1.02 1.05 0.91 0.03 -0.11 0.14 -0.06
... ... ... ... ... ...
q = 50%. Results shown for countries with more that 1% voting weight.*Change in power
index compared with Table 3.
VIII. Conclusions
In Section I we set out the questions we sought to answer in this study:
substantive ones about the distribution of voting power and methodological ones
about the empirical measurement of power. We claim to have removed some of
the obstacles in applying the power indic s approach due to difficulties of
computation (or the lack of available and appropriate software). Whatever other
conclusions we reach we claim that problems of computation which have stood in
the way of wider application of the approach have been overcome to an extent
and have used algorithms which appear to be very effective.
We proposed to answer six questions. The first and second were to
compare the voting power of individual countries with their nominal votes and to
study the relative inequality of power and votes over time. We have been able to
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give a partial answer in that our results are qualitatively unambiguous for all the
countries we have looked at when we considered ordinary decisions requiring a
50% majority: the power of the USA has been much greater than its voting
weight in every year and every other country has had correspondingly less power
than its voting weight. Over time this discrepancy has fallen for the other G5
countries while remaining large for the USA. Interestingly there was a large
power deficit for the United Kingdom in the 1940s, its big block of votes not
entitling it to as much power as the financial contribution represented by its quota
might warrant17.
While these results are interesting, it is perhaps more relevant to look at
voting power with respect to the more fundamental decisions which require a
special majority, such as increasing the size of the fund, adjustments to members’
quotas, the admission of new members and constitutional revisions. Unfortunately
the results obtained for this case are difficult to interpret, the wo power indices
used often disagreeing. There is a need to resolve the ambiguity between the
different power indices. We would suggest that by applying them to a wider
range of voting bodies  and historical periods it may be possible to gain insight
into their respective performance.
 We were also interested in whether voting paradoxes have occurred. At
the most general level we sought to find cases where a redistribution or the
accession of new members led a member country’s votes to  chang  while its
voting power changed in the opposite direction. A number of such cases were
found, although the quantitative effects were often quite small.
                                  
17 Although it remained of course the second most powerful member because power indices are
monotonic functions of weight.
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We made separate analyses of the two decision-making bodies, the
Executive Board and the Board of Governors. Generally we found power to have
been more unequal in the latter than in the former among the countries which
appointed their own executive directors. Among the other countries which were
not able to appoint their own directors and took part in the election process, a
number have in fact provided executive directors continuously. These directors
all cast much larger block votes in the Executive Board than their own country
does in the Board of Governors because they were elected by a group of
countries and cast the votes of all those who voted for them. How this  process
can be analysed and in particular whether it can be regarded as a composed game
must be left for further research.
We investigated the effect of different decision rules on the distribution of
power in the Executive Board and found that a larger majority requirement would
have tended to reduce the power of the United States, contrary to common
assumption. This result is however consistent with the warnings of Keynes who
argued that a voting system which had a majority requirement so high as to
ensure a built-in American veto would not necessarily enhance that country's
power to influence decisions within the organisation. On the other hand retaining
a veto for one country on the basis of a high special majority requirement reduces
the ability of the organisation itself to take decisions.
This is perhaps the most interesting result of the analysis. It suggests that
retaining special majorities creates a distortion in the voting system which in itself
constitutes a lack of transparency. The effect is twofold: it reduces the likelihood
that the IMF voting bodies will be able to take a necessary decision because of
the high number of votes required for a majority, leading to rigidity; and it also
means that the inequality in the distribution of power is substantially different
from that which is theoretically built into the voting system: it is much closer to
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being egalitarian than intended. We therefore reach the conclusion that the special
majorities are a short sighted feature and contribute little to the effective running
of the organisation.
We have also done a limited amount of scenario analysis, using the method
of power indices to examine the implications of one rather obvious change which
might be contemplated: the combination of the fifteen countries of the European
Union into a single voting block. Our results show clearly that it would be in a
dominant position and that the United States would suffer a large reduction in
power below its voting weight.
The main question of methodological interest (apart from the feasibility of
calculating them in practice) is to compare the performance of the two classical
power indices, the Banzhaf index and the S apley-Shubik index. The Banzhaf
index has been used in more applications largely due to its comparative ease of
computation. In this study this has not been an issue. The results indicate that the
Banzhaf index tends to be more sensitive to the data than the Shapley-Shubik
index and often gives more extreme results. How to relate this to the concept of
power in practical contexts is not obvious however. It is possible that by such
studies as this, of real institutions for which there exists independent knowledge
based on experience, light will be cast on the respective ability of the indices to
reflect power relations. From this study we would suggest that the results
obtained in section VII(e) for the effect of the majority quota on power relations
indicate greater plausibility for the Banzhaf index, the Shapley-Shubik index
giving a seemingly too slow convergence to equality. This, together with the
discussion of the indices' respective treatment of coalitions in section II leads us
to a preference for the Banzhaf results.
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Figure 1: Historical Trends (Ordinary Decisions) USA
(a) Power Indices, Executive Directors
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(d) Power Ratios, Governors
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Figure 2: Historical Trends (Ordinary Decisions) UK
(a) Power Indices, Executive Directors
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(c) Power Indices, Governors
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(d) Power Ratios, Governors
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Figure 3: Historical Trends (Ordinary Decisions) France
(a) Power Indices, Executive Directors
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(c) Power Indices, Governors
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(b) Power Ratios, Executive Directors
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(d) Power Ratios, Governors
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Fig. 4: Historical Trends (Ordinary Decisions) Germany
(a) Power Indices, Executive Directors
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(c) Power Indices, Governors
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(b) Power Ratios, Executive Directors
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(d) Power Ratios, Governors
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Figure 5: Historical Trends (Ordinary Decisions) Japan
(a) Power Indices, Executive Directors
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(c) Power Indices, Governors
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(d) Power Ratios, Governors
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Fig. 6 Trends in Power Ratios (Ordinary Decisions)
(a) Bz Index, Executive Directors
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(c) Bz Index, Governors
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(b) SS Index, Executive Directors
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(d) SS Index, Governors
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Figure 7: Historical Trends (Special Majorities) USA
(a) Power Indices, Executive Directors
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(c) Power Indices, Governors   
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  Figure 8: Historical Trends (Special Majorities) UK
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(d) Power Ratios, Governors  
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Fig. 9: Historical Trends (Special Majorities) France
(a) Power Indices, Executive Directors
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(c) Power Ratios, Governors   
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Fig. 10: Historical Trends (Special Majorities) Germany
(a) Power Indices, Executive Directors
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(c) Power Indices, Governors  
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(d) Power Ratios, Governors  
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Fig. 11: Historical Trends (Special Majorities) Japan
(a) Power Indices, Executive Directors
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(c) Power Indices, Governors  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
9
5
3
1
9
5
5
1
9
5
7
1
9
5
9
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
3
1
9
6
5
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
Votes
Bz Index
SS Index
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(d) Power Ratios, Governors
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Figure 12: Trends in Power Ratios (Special Majorities)
(a) Bz Index, Executive Directors
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(c) Bz Index, Governors  
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(b) SS Index, Executive Directors
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(d) SS Index, Governors  
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Figure 13: Effect of Variation in Majority Quota
(a) Bz Index 1946     
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(c) Bz Index, 1996   
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(b) SS Index, 1946   
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(d) SS Index, 1996  
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Figure 14 Effect of a European Union Voting Block
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(c) Changes in Power Indices, SS Index   
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(b) Changes in Power Indices, Bz Index  
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Appendix
IMF EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND VOTING POWER
ON APRIL 30, 199618
Director19 Casting Votes by Percent of
(Alternate) Votes of Country Total Votes20 Fund Total21
Appointed:
United States United States 265,518 265,518 17.78
(United States)
Germany Germany 82,665 82,665 5.54
(Germany)
Japan Japan 82,668 82,665 5.54
(Japan)
France France 74,396 74,396 4.98
 (France)
United Kingdom United Kingdom 74,396 74,396 4.98
(United Kingdom)
Elected:
Belgium Austria 12,133
(Austria) Belarus 3,054
Belgium 31,273
Czech Republic 6,146
Hungary 7,798
Kazakhstan 2,725
Luxembourg 1,605
Slovak Republic 2,824
Slovenia 1,755
Turkey 6,670 75,983 5.09
Netherlands Armenia 925
(Canada) Bulgaria 4,899
Croatia 2,866
Cyprus 1,250
Georgia 1,360
Israel 6,912
Macedonia, former
 Yugoslav Republic of 746
Moldova 1,150
Netherlands 34,692
Romania 7,791
Ukraine 10,223 72,814 4.88
Venezuela Costa Rica 1,440
(Spain) El Salvador 1,506
Guatemala 1,788
Honduras 1,200
Mexico 17,783
Nicaragua 1,211
                                  
18 From the IMF Annual Report 1996.
19 Nationality of Director or Alternate.
20 Voting power varies on certain matters pertaining to the General Department with use of the Fund’s
resources  in that Department.
21 Percentages of total votes (1,493,331) in the General Department and the Special Drawing rights
Department.
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Spain 19,604
Venezuela 19,763 64,295 4.31
Italy Albania 603
(Greece) Greece 6,126
Italy 46,157
Malta 925
Portugal 5,826
San Marino 350 59,987 4.02
Canada Antigua and Barbuda 335
(Ireland) Bahamas, The 1,199
Barbados 739
Bruce 385
Canada 43,453
Dominica 310
Grenada 335
Ireland 5,500
Jamaica 2,259
St. Kitts and Nevis 315
St. Lucia 360
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines 310 58,800 3.72
Sweden Denmark 10,949
(Denmark) Estonia 715
Finland 8,868
Iceland 1,103
Latvia 1,165
Lithuania 1485
Norway 11,196
Sweden 16,390 51,771 3.47
Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia 51,556 51,556 3.45
(Saudi Arabia)
Australia Australia 23,582
(Korea) Kiribati 290
Korea 8,246
Marshall Islands 275
Micronesia,
   Federated States of 285
Mongolia 621
New Zealand 6,751
Papua New Guinea 1,203
Philippines 6,584
Seychelles 310
Solomon Islands 325
Vanuatu 375
Western Samoa 335 49,182 3.29
Egypt Bahrain 1,078
(Bahrain) Egypt 7,034
Iraq 5,290
Jordan 1,467
Kuwait 10,202
Lebanon 1,710
Libya 8,426
Maldives 305
Oman 1,444
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Qatar 2,155
Syrian Arab Republic 2,349
United Arab Emirates 4,171
Yemen, Republic of 2,015 47,646 3.19
Russia Russia 43,381 43,381 2.90
(Russia)
Indonesia Cambodia 900
(Malaysia) Fiji 761
Indonesia 15,226
Lao People's Democratic
  Republic 641
Malaysia 8,577
Myanmar 2,099
Nepal 770
Singapore 3,826
Thailand 5,989
Tonga 300
Vietnam 2,666 41,755 2.80
Switzerland Azerbaijan 1,420
(Poland) Kyrgyz Republic 895
Poland 10,135
Switzerland 24,954
Tajikistan 850
Turkmenistan 730
Uzbekistan 2,145 41,229 2.76
Iran Afghanistan, Islamic
(Morocco)   State of 1,454
Algeria 9,394
Ghana 2,990
Iran, Islamic Republic of 11,035
Morocco 4,527
Pakistan 7,832
Tunisia 2,310 39,542 2.65
Brazil Brazil 21,958
(Colombia) Colombia 5,863
Dominican Republic 1,838
Ecuador 2,442
Guyana 922
Haiti 857
Panama 1,746
Suriname 926
Trinidad and Tobago 2,718 39470 2.63
India Bangladesh 4,175
(Sri Lanka) Bhutan 295
India 30,805
Sri Lanka 3,286 38,561 2.58
Swaziland Angola 2,323
(Zimbabwe) Botswana 616
Burundi 822
Eritrea 365
Albania 1,233
Gambia, The 479
Kenya 2,144
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Lesotho 489
Liberia 963
Malawi 759
Mozambique 1,090
Namibia 1,246
Nigeria 13,066
Sierra Leone 1,022
Swaziland 615
Tanzania 1,719
Uganda 1,589
Zambia 3,885
Zimbabwe 2,863 37,388 2.50
China China 34,102 34,102 2.28
(China)
Peru Argentina 18,621
(Argentina) Bolivia 1,512
Chile 6,467
Paraguay 971
Peru 4,911
Uruguay 2,503 31,985 2.14
Cote d'Ivoire Benin 703
(Gabon) Burkina Paso 692
Cameroon 1,601
Cape Verde 320
Central African Republic 662
Chad 663
Comoros 315
Congo 829
Cote d'Ivoire 2,632
Djibouti 368
Equatorial Guinea 493
Gabon 1,383
Guinea 1,037
Guinea-Bissau 355
Madagascar 1,154
Mali 939
Mauritania 725
Maldives 983
Niger 733
Rwanda 848
Sao Tome and Principe 305
Senegal 1,439
Togo 793 19,936 1.34
1,475,53332223 98.8124
                                  
22 This total does not include the votes of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Somalia, and
South Africa, which did not participate in the 1994 Regular Election of Executive Directors. The
combined votes of those members total 17,808-1.19 percent of those in the General Department and
Special Drawing Rights Department.
23 This total does not include the votes of Sudan and Zaire, which were suspended effective August 9,
1993 and June 2, 1994, respectively, pursuant to Article XXVI, Section 2(b) of the Articles of
Agreement.
24 This figure may differ from the sum of the percentages shown for individual Directors because of
rounding.
